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CURRENT LAW REVIEW DIGEST SERIES
of Citizens Trust Co. v. Elders3 0 and held such a mortgage void. In
this case the mortgage contained the regular provisions which we have
been discussing. It was valid on its face, but the mortgagor, without
accounting to the mortgagee, sold the stock and used the proceeds
to replenish the goods sold. The court held that such a mortgage
was rendered void as against creditors as far as the stock so affected
was concerned.
Another problem which arises concerning this type of chattel mortgage is what is the effect where part of the mortgage is declared invalid?
In answer to this quesfion the cases are in conflict. However, a majority of the jurisdictions hold that where the mortgagor has power to
sell a part of the goods so covered, the mortgage is not void in whole
but it may be void as far as it allows the sale of the part of the goods.
The states which hold thus are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. 1 The minority view is that where the mortgagor is given
the power to sell a part of the goods and the mortgage is void in part,
the whole mortgage is colored and is void. The states which hold
32
this view are: Colorado, Minnesota, New York, and Tennessee.
Here, again, it must be said that the holding of a court on a particular
mortgage will depend on the facts of each case.
It is extremely difficult to make a general statement concerning
this problem of a chattel mortgage on a stock of goods. Since the
facts and circumstances of each case influence the different courts in
their decisions, each case must be considered in light of the particular
court's general rules as to the broad subject of chattel mortgages.
However, it must be said that in spite of these broad, general statements or essentials reliance should not be placed on them to guarantee
absolute validity for the chattel mortgage. A study must be made of
the courts' decisions in the particular jurisdiction in question. For
only in this way will the essentials required for a valid chattel mortgage on a stock of goods be discovered for the state desired.
Charles M. Boynton.
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AD rNisTRAT E AGENCIES UNDER FmE. Wayland H. Elsbree, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 1944.-The legal jargon of
the day continues to be embellished by the phrase "administrative absolutism." The legal profession is warned that the adoption of unconstitutional doctrines by administrative agencies threatens to produce a
80

212 Mo. App. 589, 259 S. W. 136 (1923).

31 See also 73 A. L. R. 293.
32 See 73 A. L. R. 295.
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bureaucracy that will destroy it; at the same time, it is informed that
administrative law now and in the future offers the greatest opportunity for the practitioner.
Specifically, what agencies are indulging in unconstitutional practices or encouraging the spread of unconstitutional practices? What
remedy do the critics propose and is it sound? Finally is there any program upon which sincere advocates for improvement in the functioning
of such agencies can unite?
We are told by these critics that all administrative agencies have
a tendency to go beyond or outside the statute creating them, to adjudicate matters without granting a hearing to one of the parties, and to
make administrative rules exceeding statutory authority. They fail in
that they do not specify in what respects the alleged excesses are not
subject to judicial check, thus this supports the conclusion either that
the evils complained of are not as serious as the reformers claim or else
the courts are not conscientiously discharging their functions of review,
an assumption very hard to support.
These critics further propose to have Congress enact a code of administrative procedure for all federal agencies. After two years of intensive study, a distinguished committee of lawyers rejected such a proposal. They pointed out that such a proposal of an all-out code for all
agencies would result in either mere hortatory provisions; commanding the obvious, or laying down specific requirements certain to be
harmful to some agencies. In other words each agency has a different
code of rules. The committee made a number of recommendations and
embodied a greater part of these recommendations in a bill proposed
for Congressional enactment. The four main features of this bill embrace (1) the creation of an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure,
a permanent agency to be devoted to the study and co-ordination of
administrative procedures for the purpose of achieving improvements
that could not be possible through omnibus legislation, (2) provision
for publication of proposed rules in advance to give parties affected
an opportunity to be heard in the rule-making process, (3) creation of
hearing commissioners to improve the adjudication process, (4) and
finally authorization for the issuance of binding, declaratory rulings to
aid interested parties seeking authoritative statements of their rights
and duties. By the adoption of an Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure, we may hope for sustained orderly progress in administrative procedure.
Theodore M. Ryan.

by John Eric Nordskog,
PSYCHIATRY IN CRmrNAL TimAn.s..
Southern California Law Review, June, 1944.-Many evils have grown
out of the so called insanity plea and are becoming of great concern
to both the lawyer and public. In fact it has resulted in many new
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studies and developments, and a revision of data in textbooks on the
subject. Yet with legal tradition and trial procedure being so reluctant
to change, all of these advancements seem to be in vain for the present,
and it will be some time before psychiatry can be adopted or used in a
trial by jury or even a trial by judge only. The main objection is the
emphasis on jury trial, and the due process features of the federal and
most state constitutions.
The old theory that criminals were born, as such, and the ancient
theory that some evil was responsible for the crime have been outmoded, and the final result is that criminals are not born but are a result of their social environment. True, their attitudes may vary, but
what they become depends upon their culture area and social influence.
From this increasing evidence the criminal should be studied individually, so that he will get fairer trials in court and be placed in the correct penal or corrective institution.
Psychiatry was started to heal mental disorders but today it can be
used successfully to find out mental causes of crime - if they actually
exist - and aid the courts in proving or disproving the plea of insanity. Even the earliest laws took into account intention and responsibility for criminal acts and qualified punishments accordingly.
The main argument of the psychiatrist is that insanity has grown to
be a standard defense plea and that too much emphasis is placed upon
the reports of psychiatrists who often differ because of the different
methods of investigation, and often times their reports are ridiculous
in comparison with the other testimony presented in the case - yet the
judge and jury will often times close their eyes to the other evidence
presented and base their decision on the reports of different psychiatrists. Thus the result is that cases are often won not in terms of law,
but according to who can manipulate the psychiatrists the best.
The solution to this evil would be to let the decision rest upon the
psychiatrists, not, however, in the present state of development, but
have the entire routine tried before a trained board of criminologists
also composed of social workers, and thus the criminal will be tried and
sentenced before an impartial board of skillfully trained criminologists
and laymen.
The blame is not to be placed on the lawyers or psychiatrists alone,
because it is not their purpose that criminals should go free from their
crimes. But both the legal and medical professions should get together
and work out something, depending on how far the legal profession is
willing to go. If this could be accomplished, a criminal trial would not be
looked upon as brutal because of the punishment imposed, but rather
as one with humanitarian methods involved, and actually trying to rehabilitate the criminal. Then the legal profession would be viewed as a
servant of society, and rid it of the ruthless criminal lawyer who gets
criminals off on insanity pleas.
J. M. Chrisovergis.
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THE WAR LABOR BOARD AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST .. . by Harl R.
Douglass, Rocky Mt. Law Review, June, 1944.-With the establishment of the War Labor Board a long time economic need was partially
fulfilled. The national emergency with its complex economic and socioeconomic problems was the impetus that ultimately took form in the
W.L.B. Three principal economic problems, fostered by an unnatural
demand for goods used by the government in the prosecution of the
war effort, had to be met and successfully handled by the W.L.B. if a
disastrous inflationary period were to be avoided. The first of these
problems was a ridiculous wage scale caused by huge governmental
purchases that insured every manufacturer a lucrative profit. The second problem was the critical manpower shortage with its concomitant
deadly bidding for labor, that was already scarce because of military
needs. The third problem to be coped with was the ever-increasing purchasing power of the American consumer as contrasted with the everdiminishing supply of available consumption goods and services. To
meet these three vast and imperative problems was the task that confronted the W.L.B.
The board, with representatives from the three interested groups;
labor, management, and the general public, met the challenge of these
abnormal economic conditions and achieved remarkable results. It has
(1) effected to a degree, uniformity in wages, (2) distributed intelligently the valuable manpower and kept job changing at a minimum,
(3) done much to bridge the insidious inflationary gap that must be
bridged if we are to avoid the chasm of destructive inflation. As to the
future of the board, Mr. Douglass makes this valuable commentary
of the current need of such an agency:
"Whether this advance may be conserved and retained in peace
times remains to be seen. Reaction against bureaucracy, and government regimentation, almost psychopathic in its emotional intensity and
lack of rationale has evidenced itself in recent years. Born of shortsighted thinking, political chicanery, and misdirected self-interest, as
well as an attachment to laissez-faire and rugged individualism and to
associated traditions of mind and speech which no longer are appropriate to contemporary economic structure and functioning, the people
have been excited by a somewhat mercenary and short-sighted public
press."
If the W.L.B., or a comparable organization, is to be retained when
the crisis is passed seems a matter of conjecture. Whether the bounds
of "rugged individualism" are loosed sufficiently or whether political
expediency will demand the dissolution of the board, is something that
only time, with the unfolding of coming historic events, will tell.

Francis J. Paulson.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION POR RAILROAD EMPLOYEES,

Vernon X.

Miller, Loyola Law Review, June, 1944.-This article deals with the
advisability of replacing the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
U.S.C. Sec. 51 et seq. 1940) with a national compensation scheme for
all railroad workers, corresponding roughly to the various workmen's
compensation laws now obtaining in 47 of the 48 states, with which
all lawyers are familiar. The main points of divergence between the
existing federal law and the various state compensation laws now in effect appear to consist of (1) the retention in the federal law of the assumption of risk defense, which is available to the carriers and in some
instances bars recovery completely, and (2) the absence in the federal
law of any administrative body analogous to the various state industrial boards and commissions to find facts and award compensation
pursuant to some statutory schedule. It is further noted that when proceeding under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, supra, there is no
statutory limit on the sum that may be recovered in the event of wrongful death.
The need for such a national compensation scheme is emphasized,
according to the author, by the confusion arising out of the definition
of interstate commerce incorporated in the 1939 amendment to the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, supra, wiping out case law refinements bearing on the question of what constituted interstate commerce
under the prior law. The result has been that injured railroad employ•ees such as members of construction gangs and switchmen, whose interstate commerce status is at best doubtful, are at a loss as to whether to
proceed under a state compensation law or chance the applicability of
the federal law. And, having unsuccessfully sought relief under one procedure, claimants run the risk of being barred from the other by reason
of statutory time limitations.
The author discusses the alternative of federal withdrawal from the
interstate commerce employment-relations picture entirely and projecting existing state compensation laws into the legal vacuum remaining.
As a matter of fact, that very situation now obtains with respect to interstate truck drivers, no act of Congress having been adopted for their
protection. It is mentioned that notwithstanding the hesitancy of some
state courts to apply their local compensation laws to interstate truck
drivers, yet as a matter of law there is no constitutional impediment to
applying these laws so long as they are not repugnant to laws passed
in pursuance of the paramount power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.1
The author comments favorably on state attempts to effect a sort
of integration between their own compensation laws and the federal
liability statute. In Indiana, for example, railroad workmen are ex1 See Spohn v. Industrial Commission, 138 Ohio St. 42, 32 N. E. (2d) 554,
133 A. L. R. 951 (1941).

